Multi-lateral trade negotiations and the Most Favored Nation clause

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McCalman, P
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00129-5
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 151-176
• 关键词: economic integration; private information; Most Favored Nation

摘要

This paper considers the interaction between private information and the Most Favored Nation clause in trade negotiations. It demonstrates that by aggregating uncertainty over a number of trading partners, the Most Favored Nation clause may offer a welfare improvement over a set of bilateral trade negotiations. This improvement is shown to be most pronounced when a large number of countries are involved in negotiations. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.