Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation: an application to the free-rider problem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Magee, C
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00146-5
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 449-471
• 关键词: Lobbying; TARIFFS; free-rider problem

摘要

This paper develops a model in which tariffs are determined through bargaining between a utility maximizing policy maker and an industry lobby. Individual firms only contribute to the lobbying effort if it is in their own self-interest so that both trade policies and lobby formation are endogenous. By introducing bargaining between the industry and the government. the paper provides microfoundations for the tariff-formation function approach taken by many authors in the political economy literature. Applied to the free-rider problem, the model identifies general conditions under which increasing the number of firms in an industry makes cooperation between them more difficult. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.