Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Conconi, P; Perroni, C
• 署名单位: University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00157-X
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 423-447
• 关键词: international cooperation; trade and environmental policy negotiations

摘要

We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in - the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction for the viability of multilateral cooperation when countries are linked by international trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, while in some cases negotiation tie-in has either no effect or can make multilateral cooperation more viable, in others a formal tie-in constraint can make an otherwise viable joint multilateral agreement unstable. (C) 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.