Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heinemann, F; Illing, G
• 署名单位: University of Munich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00167-2
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 429-450
• 关键词: Coordination game; Global game; speculative attack; TRANSPARENCY

摘要

Models with multiple equilibria are a popular way to explain currency attacks. Morris and Shin (1998) have shown that, in the context of those models, unique equilibria may prevail once noisy private information is introduced. In this paper, we apply the method of Morris and Shin to a broader class of probability distributions and show-using the technique of iterated elimination of dominated strategies-that their results continue to hold, even if we allow for sunspots and individual uncertainty about strategic behavior of other agents. We provide a clear exposition of the logic of this model and we analyze the impact of transparency on the probability of a speculative attack. For the case of uniform distribution of noisy signals, we show that increased transparency of government policy reduces the likelihood of attacks. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.