Disagreement points in trade negotiations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Furusawa, T; Wen, Q
• 署名单位: Yokohama National University; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00137-4
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 133-150
• 关键词: tariff negotiation; Nash bargaining solution; non-cooperative bargaining; endogenous interim disagreement payoff

摘要

This paper analyzes trade negotiations between two large countries in the framework of an alternating-offer bargaining model with endogenous interim disagreement actions, Despite of the flexibility in disagreement tariff selection, the countries would keep the status quo tariffs in disagreement periods as far as the country which benefits from keeping the status quo tariffs compensates for the other country's foregone gains from deviating in disagreement actions. Each equilibrium outcome converges to a corresponding Nash bargaining solution whose disagreement point reflects the status quo tariff rates as well as the threat of raising the tariff to the Nash tariff rate. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.