Trade interdependence, the international financial institutions, and the recent evolution of sovereign-debt renegotiations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Klimenko, MM
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00165-9
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 177-209
• 关键词: Bargaining games; NEGOTIATIONS; debt rescheduling

摘要

This paper analyzes the effect of a debtor country's pattern of trade with commercial creditors' home countries on the outcome of debt-rescheduling negotiations. The analysis reveals that a debtor country with more market power has greater leverage in a three-way debt-re scheduling negotiation that includes the debtor country, its creditors and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). The paper also considers the effects of the IFI sovereign-debt policy on the bargaining power of the parties in debt-rescheduling negotiations. Two bargaining frameworks analyzed and compared in the paper represent the negotiation mechanism at different stages of the IFI sovereign-debt policy evolution, (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.