Gradualism in free trade agreements: a theoretical justification

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chisik, R
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; Florida International University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(02)00019-3
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 367-397
• 关键词: TRADE NEGOTIATIONS; gradualism; irreversibilities; Economic integration; dynamic games

摘要

A notable feature of many recent trade agreements is the gradual, rather than immediate, reduction of trade barriers. In this paper we model trade liberalization as a cooperative relationship that evolves gradually in a non-cooperative environment. We show that specialization, capacity irreversibility and the development of trade-partner specific capital increase the benefit of continuing the liberalizing relationship and decrease, over time, the lowest obtainable self-enforcing tariff. By increasing the penalty of future defection, sunk costs ensure that the self-enforcing trading relationship starts slowly, but once in progress the level of cooperation continues to improve. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.