Discriminatory tariffs and international negotiations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ederington, J; McCalman, P
• 署名单位: University of Miami; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00004-7
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 397-424
• 关键词: TRADE AGREEMENTS; DISPUTE SETTLEMENT; Non-discrimination

摘要

Recent research has highlighted the efficiency of the MFN principle within the GATT/WTO structure. This paper analyzes the exception made to MFN within Article XXIII that allows discriminatory punishment for deviations from the agreement. We argue that, in the absence of collusion, the MFN exception reduces the severity of punishment and thus lowers the level of cooperation that can be achieved by the agreement. However, discriminatory punishment may still be beneficial as we show that it reduces the problems associated with the potential for renegotiation during the punishment phase. Finally, we argue that our results are also applicable to the question of whether to use trade policy sanctions as a means of enforcing agreements covering domestic policies. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.