Managers, investors, and crises: mutual fund strategies in emerging markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kaminsky, G; Lyons, RK; Schmukler, SL
• 署名单位: George Washington University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; The World Bank
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00075-8
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 113-134
• 关键词: mutual funds; Managers; investors; trading strategies; Emerging markets; momentum; feedback trading; CRISIS; contagion

摘要

We examine the trading strategies of mutual funds in emerging markets. We develop a method for disentangling the behavior of fund managers from that of underlying investors. For both managers and investors, we strongly reject the null hypothesis of no momentum trading: mutual funds systematically sell losers and buy winners. Selling current losers and buying current winners is stronger during crises, and equally strong for managers and investors. Selling past losers and buying past winners is stronger for managers. Managers and investors also practice contagion trading-they sell (buy) assets from one country when asset prices fall (rise) in another. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.