Trade disputes and the implementation of protection under the GATT: an empirical assessment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bown, CP
• 署名单位: Brandeis University; Brandeis University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00053-9
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 263-294
• 关键词: tariff retaliation; GATT/WTO; trade disputes; RECIPROCITY

摘要

This paper is a first attempt to empirically determine why countries choose to violate or adhere to GATT rules when making trade policy adjustments between negotiating rounds. We use a previously unexploited set of data in which countries implemented two 'types' of protection under the GATT system between 1973 and 1994: (i) 'legal' protection in which countries utilized the GATT's safeguards provisions; and (ii) 'illegal' protection in which the protection was provided outside of the safeguards provisions, resulting in a formal trade dispute. We find substantial evidence that concerns for retaliation affect government policy decisions in ways which contribute to the explanation of the existence of trade disputes. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.