Crisis costs and debtor discipline: the efficacy of public policy in sovereign debt crises

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gai, P; Hayes, S; Shin, HS
• 署名单位: Australian National University; Bank of England; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00052-7
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 245-262
• 关键词: crisis management; international financial architecture

摘要

Recent debate on the reform of the international financial architecture has highlighted the potentially important role of the official sector in crisis management. We examine how such public intervention in sovereign debt crises affects efficiency, ex ante and ex post. Our results shed light on the scale of capital inflows and the implications for debtor country output of such a regime. The efficacy of measures such as officially sanctioned stays on creditor litigation depend critically on the quality of public sector surveillance and the size of the costs of sovereign debt crises. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.