Search for an object with two attributes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Olszewski, Wojciech; Wolinsky, Asher
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.004
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 145-160
• 关键词: search; matching; Attributes

摘要

This paper presents and analyzes a simple equilibrium search model. On one side, there is a population of searchers; on the other side, a population of objects. Searchers are strategic decision makers who are there to get matched to an object, while objects have no preferences or decisions to make. The main novelty is that an object is characterized by two attributes, but a searcher can observe only one at the point of decision. This generates some interesting phenomena such as multiplicity of equilibria, in some of which the searcher's payoff is a discontinuous function of the observed attribute and the adoption decision is not everywhere monotonic in the observed attribute. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.