The political economy of international factor mobility

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Facchini, G; Willmann, G
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Kiel
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2004.10.004
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 201-219
• 关键词: FD1; migration; political economy; common agency

摘要

We model the endogenous determination of policy towards international factor mobility. In a common agency setting, domestic interest groups bid for protection from the government and the incumbent politicians maximize a welfare function that depends both on domestic voters' welfare and contributions collected. We characterize equilibrium policies in the price space and show how the degree of complementarity among inputs determines the outcome. We establish a similar result for quotas, allowing for partial rent capturing. For the strategic environment under consideration, we also establish a general equivalence result between tariffs and quotas if capturing is complete. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.