In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garcia, Julian; van Veelen, Matthijs
• 署名单位: Monash University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.007
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 161-189
• 关键词: Repeated games; evolutionary game theory

摘要

In the repeated prisoner's dilemma there is no strategy that is evolutionarily stable, and a profusion of neutrally stable ones. But how stable is neutrally stable? We show that in repeated games with large enough continuation probabilities, where the stage game is characterized by a conflict between individual and collective interests, there is always a neutral mutant that can drift into a population that is playing an equilibrium, and create a selective advantage for a second mutant. The existence of stepping stone paths out of any equilibrium determines the dynamics in finite populations playing the repeated prisoner's dilemma. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.