Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bagwell, K; Staiger, RW
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.06.001
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 268-294
• 关键词: nondiscrimination; RECIPROCITY; bilateral opportunism; Trade agreements

摘要

Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. We identify rules of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not participating in the bilateral negotiation. Our main finding is that the two central principles of GATT/WTO nondiscrimination (MFN) and reciprocity-preserve the welfare of nonparticipating governments and therefore offer a first-line of defense against bilateral opportunism. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.