Renegotiation, collective action clauses and sovereign debt markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Weinschelbaum, F; Wynne, J
• 署名单位: Duke University; Universidad de San Andres Argentina
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2004.09.007
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 47-72
• 关键词: sovereign debt; Collective Action Clauses; RENEGOTIATION; moral hazard; international bankruptcy court

摘要

Collective action clauses (CACs) are provisions specifying that a supermajority of bondholders can change the terms of a bond. We study how CACs determine goventments' fiscal incentives, sovereign bond prices, and default probabilities in environments with and without contingent debt and IMF presence. We claim that CACs are likely to be an irrelevant dimension of debt contracts in current sovereign debt markets because of the variety of instruments utilized by sovereigns and the implicit IMF guarantee. Nonetheless, under a new international bankruptcy regime like that recently proposed by the IMF, CACs can increase significantly the cost of borrowing for sovereigns, contrary to what is suggested in previous empirical literature. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.