Strategic trade and delegated competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miller, NH; Pazgal, A
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2004.04.003
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 215-231
• 关键词: strategic international trade; delegation games

摘要

Strategic trade theory has been criticized on the grounds that its predictions are overly sensitive to modeling assumptions. Applying recent results in duopoly theory, this paper considers three-stage games in which governments choose subsidies, firms' owners choose incentive schemes for their managers, and then the managers compete in the product market. We show that if firms' owners have sufficient control over their managers' behavior, then the optimal strategic trade policy does not depend on the mode of product-market competition, i.e., whether firms compete by setting prices or quantities. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.