Analytics of sovereign debt restructuring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Haldane, AG; Penalver, A; Saporta, V; Shin, HS
• 署名单位: Bank of England; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2003.12.004
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 315-333
• 关键词: sovereign debt; restructuring mechanisms; Collective Action Clauses; international bankruptcy court; International Monetary Fund

摘要

This paper develops a simple theoretical model to analyse recent proposals on restructuring of sovereign bonds. We find that collective action clauses (CACs) inserted in bonds resolve the inefficiencies caused by intra-creditor coordination problems providing that all parties have complete information about each other's preferences. In such a world, statutory mechanisms, such as international bankruptcy courts, are unnecessary. This is no longer the case when the benefits from reaching a restructuring agreement are private information to the debtor and its creditors due to inefficiencies caused by the debtor-creditor bargaining problem. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.