Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mishra, Debasis
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.011
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 925-954
• 关键词: Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility; Single-peaked domain; Elementary monotonicity

摘要

We study deterministic voting mechanisms by considering an ordinal notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC). If the beliefs of agents are independent and generic, we show that a mechanism is OBIC and satisfies an additional condition called elementary monotonicity if and only if it is a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism. Our result works in a large class of preference domains (that include the unrestricted domain, the single-peaked domain, the single-dipped domain, and some single-crossing domains) We can significantly weaken elementary monotonicity in our result in the single-peaked domain if we assume unanimity and in a large class of domains if we assume unanimity and tops-onlyness. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.