International versus domestic auditing of bank solvency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Feltenstein, A; Lagunoff, R
• 署名单位: International Monetary Fund; Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2004.09.004
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 73-96
• 关键词: bank insolvency; auditing; international auditing

摘要

This paper examines alternative ways to prevent losses from bank insolvencies. We develop a model that compares two alternative institutions for bank auditing. The first is a system of central bank auditing of national banks. The second is carried out by an international agency that collects and disseminates risk information on banks in all countries. The international auditor is shown to perform at least as well, and sometimes better than, auditing by either central banks or voluntary disclosure by the banks themselves in preventing losses. The international auditor's credibility comes from the fact that its incentives are not distorted by a sovereignty bias. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.