Self-control and bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lu, Shih En
• 署名单位: Simon Fraser University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.05.003
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 390-413
• 关键词: self-control; bargaining; time inconsistency; Quasi-hyperbolic discounting

摘要

This paper examines a bargaining game with alternating proposals where sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounters negotiate over an infinite stream of payoffs. In Markov perfect equilibrium, payoffs are almost always unique, and a small advantage in self-control can result in a large advantage in payoff. In subgame-perfect equilibrium, a multiplicity of payoffs and delay can arise, despite the complete information setting. Markov perfect equilibria are the best subgame-perfect equilibria for the agent with more self-control, and the worst for the agent with less self-control. Naivete can help a player by increasing their reservation value. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.