Endogenous financial intermediation and real effects of capital account liberalization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alessandria, G; Qian, J
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; Boston College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2004.10.003
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 97-128
• 关键词: Financial intermediation; Capital account; moral hazard; lending contracts

摘要

We consider lending and investment under asymmetric information in a small, developing economy. We allow different forms of financial contracts to arise endogenously. Financial intermediaries mitigate a moral hazard problem in investment choice through costly monitoring. We then examine the impact of opening the capital account on both welfare and the structure of lending contracts. Liberalizing the capital account may improve or worsen the efficiency of financial intermediaries, leading to an improvement or worsening of the aggregate composition of investment projects. We show that efficient financial intermediaries in the closed economy are neither necessary nor sufficient for a capital account liberalization to improve welfare. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.