Inflation inertia and credible disinflation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calvo, Guillermo; Celasun, Oya; Kumhof, Michael
• 署名单位: Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2007.03.007
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 48-68
• 关键词: inflation inertia; staggered pricing; disinflation

摘要

We develop a model of optimizing forward-looking staggered price setting where even fully credible disinflations display a delayed and gradual inflation response and significant output losses. There is a welfare trade-off between these output losses and the gains from smaller inflationary distortions. For reasonable parameter values disinflation improves welfare, and more so if it is phased in gradually. The pricing assumption of our model yields dynamics that are similar to models of sticky information, but its state space is much simpler, thereby allowing for the application of standard linearization methods. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.