Dumping as a signal of innovation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miyagiwa, Kaz; Ohno, Yuka
• 署名单位: Emory University; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.01.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 221-240
• 关键词: International trade policy; dumping; antidumping duty; signaling game; INNOVATION

摘要

In the R&D-intensive industries, where technologies change rapidly, an innovative foreign firm may need to export greater than normal quantities to signal the level of the new technology it possesses. We find that such actions lead to sales below cost if the foreign firm has a relatively poor reputation for innovation, has a sufficiently high discount factor or possesses a new technology that significantly cuts its cost. We also show that antidumping reduces the costs of signaling, benefits the home firm, and may raise the profit to the foreign firm in the pre-duty period. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.