Free trade networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University; Boston College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.08.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 310-335
• 关键词: Free trade agreements; Customs unions; network formation game; Pairwise stability; complete FTA network

摘要

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider an n-country model in which (possibly asymmetric) countries trade differentiated industrial commodities. We show that if all countries are symmetric, the complete FTA network is pairwise stable and it is the unique stable network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable. We also compare FTAs and customs unions (CUs) as to which of these two regimes facilitates global trade liberalization, noticing that unlike CUs, each signatory of an FTA can have another FTA without consent of other member countries. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.