Auctioning countermeasures in the WTO

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bagwell, Kyle; Mavroidis, Petros C.; Staiger, Robert W.
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University; Columbia University; Stanford University; Columbia University; University of Neuchatel
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2007.03.008
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 309-332
• 关键词: GATT; WTO; Retaliation; countermeasures; auctions

摘要

We offer a first formal analysis of auctioning retaliation rights within the WTO. We show that the auctions exhibit externalities among bidders, and we characterize equilibrium bidder behavior under alternative auction formats. If the violating country is prevented from bidding to retire the right of retaliation against it, then the possibility of auction failure arises, whereby no bids are made despite positive valuation by bidders. If the violating country is instead permitted to bid, then auction failure is precluded, and indeed the right of retaliation is always retired. We evaluate these different auction formats from normative (revenue, compliance, efficiency) standpoints. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.