Incentives in landing slot problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schummer, James; Abizada, Azar
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Ministry of Education of Azerbaijan Republic; ADA University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.003
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 29-55
• 关键词: Mechanism design; Landing slots; matching; incentives

摘要

During weather-induced airport congestion, landing slots are reassigned based on flights' feasible arrival times and cancelations. We consider the airlines' incentives to report such information and to execute cancelations, creating positive spillovers for other flights. We show that such incentives conflict with Pareto-efficiency, partially justifying the FAA's non-solicitation of delay costs. We provide mechanisms that, unlike the FAA's current mechanism, satisfy our incentive properties to the greatest extent possible given the FAA's own design constraints. Our mechanisms supplement Deferred Acceptance with a self-optimization step accounting for each airline's granted right to control its assigned portion of the landing schedule. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.