The GATT and gradualism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zissimos, Ben
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.06.004
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 410-433
• 关键词: free trade; gradual trade liberalization; strategic interactions; Trade agreement; welfare

摘要

This paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Trade liberalization must be gradual, and free trade can never be achieved, if punishment. for deviation from an agreement is limited to a 'withdrawal of equivalent concessions' and if initial deviation from an agreement is also limited. The paper shows how (sufficiently patient) countries have an incentive to deviate in a limited way when operating under GATT dispute settlement procedures. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.