Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Song, Yangwei
• 署名单位: Humboldt University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.007
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 693-726
• 关键词: Efficient implementation; ambiguity aversion; Multidimensional signal; interdependent valuation

摘要

We consider a single object allocation problem with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations. When agents' signals are statistically independent, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show that efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms generally do not exist. In this paper, we extend the standard model to accommodate maxmin agents and obtain necessary as well as sufficient conditions under which efficient allocations can be implemented. In particular, we derive a condition that quantifies the amount of ambiguity necessary for efficient implementation. We further show that under some natural assumptions on the preferences, this necessary amount of ambiguity becomes sufficient. Finally, we provide a definition of informational size such that given any nontrivial amount of ambiguity, efficient allocations can be implemented if agents are sufficiently informationally small. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.