Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nocke, Volker; Rey, Patrick
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.06.003
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 183-221
• 关键词: Vertical relations; Exclusive dealing; Vertical merger; foreclosure; Bilateral contracting

摘要

We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream firms (manufacturers) that produce differentiated goods and downstream firms (retailers) that compete imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties. We show that both exclusive dealing and vertical integration between a manufacturer and a retailer lead to vertical foreclosure, to the detriment of consumers and society. Finally, we show that firms have indeed an incentive to sign such contracts or to integrate vertically. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.