Globalization and domestic conflict

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garfinkel, Michelle R.; Skaperdas, Stergios; Syropoulos, Constantinos
• 署名单位: Drexel University; University of California System; University of California Irvine
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.07.005
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 296-308
• 关键词: Trade openness; property rights; ENFORCEMENT; insecurity; Civil wars

摘要

When a resource like oil is domestically contested, trade patters and welfare can be very different than when property rights are costlessly enforced. Whereas (small-country) importers of the contested resource gain unambiguously relative to autarky, exporters of the contested resource lose under free trade, unless the world price of the resource is sufficiently high. Regardless of what price obtains in world markets, countries tend to over-export the contested resource compared to the absence of conflict. For a wide range of prices, higher international prices of the contested resource reduce welfare, an instance of the natural resource curse. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.