Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hagen, Rune Jansen
• 署名单位: University of Bergen
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2009.04.007
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 126-136
• 关键词: Multilateral financial institutions; SURVEILLANCE; Sovereign debt; cheap talk; signalling

摘要

I analyse the role of multilateral financial institutions in a world of global capital markets assuming that they have an informational advantage over private lenders in the market for sovereign debt. I show that the adverse selection problem in this market may be solved through certification if the multilateral agency does not care too much about borrower country welfare. However, with lending the private information of the agency will be revealed whatever its weighting of borrower welfare vs. private lenders' profits. Multilateral lending on concessional terms also alleviates the moral hazard problem - that investment in creditworthy borrowers is reduced as private lenders seek to avoid ex post default by constraining credit. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.