Read my lips: The role of information transmission in multilateral reform design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel
• 署名单位: University of Milan; University of Florence; University of Gottingen
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2010.11.008
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 86-98
• 关键词: IMF conditionality; DELEGATION; COMMUNICATION; OWNERSHIP

摘要

Context-specific knowledge is crucial to crafting multilateral reform programs. Nonetheless local knowledge often consists of unverifiable information, thus the quality of countries' reports depends on the conflict of interests faced by the recipient and the multilateral. We compare the performance of a delegation-scheme against a centralization-scheme. We find that recipients' discretion in the choice of reforms (delegation) should only be increased when the countries' local knowledge is strictly more important than the multilateral's information. Conversely, a reduction in the conflict of interests may lead the multilateral in to allowing the recipient less freedom in designing reforms (centralization). Our empirical results support these theoretical predictions. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.