Equilibrium parallel import policies and international market structure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roy, Santanu; Saggi, Kamal
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University; Southern Methodist University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2012.01.007
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 262-276
• 关键词: Parallel imports; oligopoly; QUALITY; product differentiation; market structure; welfare

摘要

In a North-South vertically differentiated duopoly we analyze (i) the effects of parallel import (PI) policies on price competition and (ii) the interdependence of national PI policies. Prices can be higher in the North if both countries permit PIs relative to when only the South does. If governments maximize national welfare and demand asymmetry across countries is sufficiently large, the North forbids PIs to ensure its firm sells in the South and international price discrimination the South's most preferred market outcome obtains. When demand structures are relatively similar across countries, the North permits PIs and uniform pricing its most preferred outcome results. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.