Fighting multiple tax havens

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Elsayyad, May; Konrad, Kai A.
• 署名单位: Max Planck Society; University of Munich; University of Munich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2011.09.002
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 295-305
• 关键词: Tax haven; Harmful tax practices; Bidding for haven inactivation

摘要

This paper develops a competition theory framework that evaluates an important aspect of the OECD's Harmful Tax Practices Initiative against tax havens. We show that the sequential nature of the process is harmful and more costly than a big bang multilateral agreement. The sequentiality may even prevent the process from being completed successfully. Closing down a subset of tax havens reduces competition among the havens that remain active. This makes their tax haven business more profitable and shifts a arger share of rents to these remaining tax havens, making them more reluctant to give up their tax haven business. Moreover, the outcome of this process, reducing the number of tax havens, but not eliminating them altogether, may reduce welfare in the OECD. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.