Institution-driven comparative advantage and organizational choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ferguson, Shon; Formai, Sara
• 署名单位: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); European Central Bank; Bank of Italy
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2012.11.007
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 193-200
• 关键词: International trade; comparative advantage; Contract enforcement; vertical integration

摘要

The theory of the firm suggests that firms can respond to poor contract enforcement by vertically integrating their production process. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether firms' integration opportunities affect the way contract enforcement institutions determine international trade patterns. We find that the benefits of judicial quality for the exports of contract-intense goods are more muted in industries that have a greater propensity towards vertical integration arrangements with input suppliers. We show that our results are not driven by primitive industry characteristics. Our results confirm the role of judicial quality as a source of comparative advantage and suggest that this depends not only on the technological characteristics of the goods produced but also on the way firms are able to organize the production process. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.