Is the GATT/WTO's Article XXIV bad?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mrazova, Monika; Vines, David; Zissimos, Ben
• 署名单位: University of Surrey; University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Australian National University; University of Exeter
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2012.07.007
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 216-232
• 关键词: Coalition formation game; Customs union; PROTECTION; Trade block; trade liberalization

摘要

The GATT/WTO Article XXIV prevents a customs union (CU) from raising its common external tariff. In this paper, we compare CU formation with and without this Article XXIV constraint. We show, in a multi-country oligopoly model, that for a given CU structure, Article XXIV improves world welfare by lowering trade barriers. However, we also show that Article XXIV has a composition effect on CU formation: it affects the endogenous choice of CUs. By encouraging more symmetric CUs, Article XXIV causes more trade to be subject to trade barriers. As a result, Article XXIV may be 'bad' for world welfare. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.