Would global patent protection be too weak without international coordination?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lai, Edwin L. -C.; Yan, Isabel K. M.
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; City University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2012.07.004
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 42-54
• 关键词: Intellectual property rights; patents; TRIPS; HARMONIZATION

摘要

In the standard model with free trade and social-welfare-maximizing governments a la Grossman and Lai (2004), cross-border positive policy externalities result in countries choosing a combination of patent strengths that is weaker than optimal from a global perspective. This paper introduces three new features to the analysis: trade and FDI barriers, firm heterogeneity and political economy considerations in setting patent policies. Based on calibration, we find that there would be global under-protection of patent rights when there is no international policy coordination. The empirical fact that firm revenues follow a fat-tailed distribution implies that the barriers to exploit inventions internationally are quite low, despite the fact that only a small fraction of firms sell overseas and an even smaller fraction of firms carry out FDI as a result of trade barriers. Furthermore, requiring all countries to harmonize their patent standards with the equilibrium standard of the most innovative country (the US) does not lead to global over-protection of patent rights. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.