Information agreements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Akoz, Kemal Kivanc; Samsonov, Arseniy
• 署名单位: HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Ozyegin University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106068
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Persuasion; Bargaining solution; EFFICIENCY

摘要

We define a (cooperative) informational bargaining problem, where several agents have to agree on the persuasion of a receiver. The bargaining set includes payoff vectors that can be generated by information structures and disagreement leads to an exogenous benchmark that may involve full or no information. We characterize the existence of an agreement that benefits all agents when preferences are state-independent. Our characterization yields conditions that depend only on the payoff structure but are independent of the prior beliefs in some cases. We analyze Pareto efficient information structures in two applications: selection environments, where the receiver picks the best agent, and the bargaining between a retailer platform and a regulator on consumer privacy regulation.