Market design with deferred acceptance: A recipe for characterizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dogan, Battal; Imamura, Kenzo; Yenmez, M. Bumin
• 署名单位: University of Bristol; University of Tokyo; Washington University (WUSTL); Durham University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106057
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Choice rules; Solitary choice axioms; Matching mechanisms; deferred acceptance algorithm

摘要

In matching markets, policymakers often pursue complex distributional objectives, such as promoting diversity in student populations. To this end, they embed these objectives into the choice rules of institutions, such as schools, and implement the deferred-acceptance (DA) mechanism based on those rules. Given the institutional choice rules, we introduce a method for characterizing the corresponding DA mechanism through the properties of these choice rules. Utilizing this method, we derive novel characterizations of DA mechanisms across various settings, including matching problems with enrollment guarantees and overlapping reserves-motivated by school choice in Chile-as well as environments with matroidal feasibility constraints or objectives. Our approach provides a unified framework for characterizing DA mechanisms that accommodate policy-relevant objectives.