Protection in government procurement auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cole, Matthew T.; Davies, Ronald B.; Kaplan, Todd
• 署名单位: California State University System; California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo; University College Dublin; University of Exeter; University of Haifa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.03.003
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 134-142
• 关键词: Government procurement; TARIFFS; Price preference

摘要

Discrimination against foreign bidders in procurement auctions has typically been achieved by price preferences. We demonstrate that in the bidding game, each level of protection via a price preference can be achieved by an equivalent tariff. When government welfare depends only on net expenditures, this equivalence carries over to the government's decision. As such, this equivalence provides a justification that agreements to eliminate price preferences to be taken in tandem with agreements to lower tariffs; e.g., the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) in the broader context of the WTO. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.