Suspiciously timed trade disputes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Conconi, Paola; DeRemer, David R.; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Trimarchi, Lorenzo; Zanardi, Maurizio
• 署名单位: Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies; Institute of Economics - HAS; Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Lancaster University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 57-76
• 关键词: Trade disputes; ELECTIONS; RECIPROCITY

摘要

This paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2014 period, we find that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election. Moreover, U.S. trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which re-election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.