The economics of investor protection: ISDS versus national treatment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kohler, Wilhelm; Staehler, Frank
• 署名单位: Eberhard Karls University of Tubingen; Eberhard Karls University of Tubingen; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Eberhard Karls University of Tubingen; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Eberhard Karls University of Tubingen; University of Adelaide
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2019.103254
• 发表日期: 2019
• 关键词: Investor-state dispute settlement; National treatment provision; Foreign direct investment; TTIP; TPP; regulation

摘要

Investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) are supposed to protect foreign investors against domestic policies causing unjustified harm. This paper scrutinizes the effects of ISDS and national treatment provisions in a two-period model where foreign investment is subject to a hold-up problem. It shows that ISDS may increase welfare, but comes with additional regulatory distortions in the first period. A national treatment provision avoids these regulatory distortions, but implies entry distortions because it makes the hold-up problem also apply to domestic firms. If the domestic regulatory framework applies to many domestic firms, a national treatment provision welfare-dominates ISDS. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.