Nash-in-Nash tariff bargaining
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bagwell, Kyle; Staiger, Robert W.; Yurukoglu, Ali
署名单位：
Stanford University; Dartmouth College; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1996
DOI：
10.1016/j.jinteco.2019.103263
发表日期：
2020
关键词：
摘要：
We provide an equilibrium analysis of the efficiency properties of simultaneous bilateral tariff negotiations in a three-country model of international trade. We consider the setting in which discriminatory tariffs are allowed, and we utilize the Nash-in-Nash solution concept of Horn and Wolinsky (1988). We allow for a general family of political-economic country welfare functions and assess efficiency relative to these welfare functions. We establish a sense in which the resulting tariffs are inefficient and too low, so that excessive liberalization occurs from the perspective of the three countries. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.