Sustainable cooperation in international trade: A quantitative analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mei, Yuan
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103305
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Propensity to deviate; Quantitative trade policy; Repeated game

摘要

How does the presence of multilateral institutions affect the sustainability of trade-policy cooperation? Do free-trade agreements make multilateral cooperation less sustainable? Will countries be more likely to deviate from negotiated tariffs when more trade liberalization realizes in the future? These questions have been studied in theory literature using models that feature repeated games, but have yet to be quantitatively analyzed. In this paper, I propose a methodology to quantitatively characterize the equilibrium strategies on tariffs of various nations in a widely used repeated-game framework. I then apply this methodology to address these questions from a quantitative perspective.The numerical results computed from a reasonably comprehensive general equilibrium trade model corroborate previous analysis derived theoretically from simpler trade models. However, only free-trade agreements appear to influence the sustainability of trade-policy cooperation with quantitative significance. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.