Economics of international investment agreements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Horn, Henrik; Tangeras, Thomas
• 署名单位: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Cambridge; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2021.103433
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Carve-out compensation; Foreign investment; International investment agreement; Regulatory chill; Regulatory expropriation

摘要

Nearly 2700 international investment agreements protect foreign investment against host country policies. This paper analyzes the design and implications of their contentious provisions regarding regulatory expropriations. It derives conditions under which carve-out compensation mechanisms, similar to those in actual agreements, solve underinvestment and overregulation problems and simultaneously distribute surplus according to countries' bargaining power. The paper examines a number of additional policy relevant issues, for instance, how to modify agreements when carve-out compensation is inefficient, whether agreements cause regulatory chill, and the different motives and distributional consequences of North-South versus North-North agreements. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.