A new dimension in global value chains: Control vs. delegation in input procurement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karabay, Bilgehan
• 署名单位: Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2022.103584
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Sequential supply chain; property rights; incomplete contracts; Organizational choice; DELEGATION

摘要

We study the optimal organizational structure of a firm in a sequential supply chain when investments are relationship specific and contracts are incomplete. The market structure for the final product is monopolistic competition. Production follows a preordered sequence and exhibits high complementarity between stages. There are three types of actors: upstream suppliers, downstream suppliers and final-good producers (firms). In designing their organizational structure, firms in each stage choose not only the ownership structure, i.e., vertical integration versus outsourcing, but also the input-procurement strategy, i.e., delegation versus control. The separation of asset ownership and input-procurement rights leads to a novel organizational mode, which we call 'outsourcing with delegation.' We determine the implications of this new organizational mode in firms' global sourcing decisions. (C) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.