Macroprudential policy with leakages

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bengui, Julien; Bianchi, Javier
• 署名单位: Bank of Canada; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2022.103659
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Macroprudential policy; Capital flow management; Regulatory arbitrage; financial crises; Limited regulation enforcement

摘要

We explore how imperfect regulation enforcement affects the design of optimal macro -prudential policy. We study an open economy workhorse model of macroprudential regulation motivated by pecuniary externalities. Our analytical characterization shows that imperfect en-forcement generates two opposing effects. While tighter regulation leads to higher borrowing by unregulated agents, a leakage effect, mitigating the increase in fragility calls for squeez-ing regulated agents further. Quantitative simulations show that, overall, a macroprudential policy that accounts for the leakages remains successful at mitigating the vulnerability to finan-cial crises. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.