Sovereign Debt Disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guler, Bulent; Onder, Yasin Kursat; Taskin, Temel
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Ghent University; Bank of Canada
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2025.104118
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Hidden debt; Debt disclosure; Sovereign debt; sovereign default; Sovereign-to-sovereign lending

摘要

This paper studies debt and default dynamics under alternative disclosure arrangements in a sovereign default model. The government can access both observable and hidden debt. We show that when debt is not fully disclosed, the government does not internalize the full effects of hidden debt choices on bond prices, thereby reducing the cost of holding hidden debt. We find that switching to a full disclosure regime shifts the portfolio from hidden to observable debt, exacerbating the debt dilution problem. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, this switch generates welfare losses.