RELATIVE STANDING COMPARISONS, RISK-TAKING, AND SAFETY REGULATIONS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
KONRAD, KA; LOMMERUD, KE
署名单位：
University of Bergen; University of Munich
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(93)90070-A
发表日期：
1993
页码：
345-358
关键词：
摘要：
We study the question of how relative standing comparisons, or 'status seeking, influence risk taking. When utility is separable in consumption and status the following results apply. With non-systematic risks, more concern for status leads to more (less) risk taking when, in a sense made precise in the paper, the utility function is less (more) concave in status than in pure consumption. With systematic risk, risk taking always increases with the concern for status. However, status seeking always implies socially excessive fisk taking, thus suggesting a role for public regulation of risky choices.
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